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Abstract
Swine influenza causes concern for global veterinary and public health officials. In
continuing two previous networks that initiated the surveillance of swine influenza
viruses (SIVs) circulating in European pigs between 2001 and 2008, a third
European Surveillance Network for Influenza in Pigs (ESNIP3, 2010–2013) aimed
to expand widely the knowledge of the epidemiology of European SIVs. ESNIP3
stimulated programs of harmonized SIV surveillance in European countries and
supported the coordination of appropriate diagnostic tools and subtyping methods.
Thus, an extensive virological monitoring, mainly conducted through passive
surveillance programs, resulted in the examination of more than 9 000 herds in 17
countries. Influenza A viruses were detected in 31% of herds examined from which
1887 viruses were preliminary characterized. The dominating subtypes were the
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three European enzootic SIVs: avian-like swine H1N1 (53.6%), human-like
reassortant swine H1N2 (13%) and human-like reassortant swine H3N2 (9.1%), as
well as pandemic A/H1N1 2009 (H1N1pdm) virus (10.3%). Viruses from these four
lineages co-circulated in several countries but with very different relative levels of
incidence. For instance, the H3N2 subtype was not detected at all in some
geographic areas whereas it was still prevalent in other parts of Europe.
Interestingly, H3N2-free areas were those that exhibited highest frequencies of
circulating H1N2 viruses. H1N1pdm viruses were isolated at an increasing
incidence in some countries from 2010 to 2013, indicating that this subtype has
become established in the European pig population. Finally, 13.9% of the viruses
represented reassortants between these four lineages, especially between
previous enzootic SIVs and H1N1pdm. These novel viruses were detected at the
same time in several countries, with increasing prevalence. Some of them might
become established in pig herds, causing implications for zoonotic infections.
Introduction
Pigs play an important role in influenza A virus ecology. They are susceptible to
infection with both avian and human influenza viruses, and swine influenza
viruses (SIVs) can be transmitted from pigs to other species [1–3]. Influenza A
viruses contain eight unique segments of single-stranded RNA and are typed
according to their surface glycoproteins, the hemagglutinin (HA) and the
neuraminidase (NA) [4]. Emergence of a new influenza A virus can occur through
several mechanisms: i) interspecies transmission of virus; ii) antigenic change, or
drift, in the major viral antigens through mutations; iii) genetic reassortment
following exchange of genes between two or more influenza viruses. All three
mechanisms have occurred naturally in pigs all over the world, resulting in a
complex landscape of different SIV strains circulating in different regions and
changing over time. SIVs of H1N1, H3N2 and H1N2 subtypes are enzootic in pigs
globally, but their origins as well as their genetic and antigenic characteristics
differ between continents and geographic regions [1, 5]. In Europe, the
predominant H1N1 SIVs are entirely of avian origin, introduced from waterfowl
to pigs in 1979 and referred to as ‘‘avian-like swine H1N1’’ (H1avN1) [6]. An
H3N2 influenza virus was introduced in European pigs shortly after the human
Hong-Kong influenza pandemic in 1968, but only became widespread after it
reassorted with the H1avN1 virus in the early 1980s, acquiring 6 internal protein
genes from the latter lineage [7–9]. This ‘‘human-like reassortant swine H3N2’’
(H3N2) is now the dominant genotype of H3N2 virus in European pigs. Finally,
another reassortant virus of H1N2 subtype was detected in 1994. This ‘‘human-
like reassortant swine H1N2’’ (H1huN2), which is now the predominant virus
within this subtype, also exhibits internal genes from the swine H1avN1 virus, but
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acquired the HA gene of a human H1N1 virus from the 1980s [10] and a NA gene
of human origin genetically distinct from that of the ‘‘human-like reassortant
swine H3N2’’ viruses that emerged 10 years before [11, 12]. Thus, the three major
virus lineages share common internal genes, but they have clearly antigenically
and/or genetically distinguishable HAs and NAs [12, 13].
These three SIVs have co-circulated for many years within the European pig
population even if the prevalence and incidence of individual subtypes varied
from one country to another [1, 13–15]. New reassortant viruses between these
three enzootic SIVs or between SIVs and seasonal human influenza viruses have
been detected occasionally since 2000 [1, 12, 13, 16]. However, the situation was
rather stable in European pig herds until the emergence in 2009 of the pandemic
H1N1 virus (H1N1pdm) of swine origin [17]. H1N1pdm seems to have been
generated from an American triple reassortant SIV that acquired the NA and
matrix (M) genes from the Eurasian H1avN1 lineage [18–20]. The H1N1pdm
virus was detected in humans several weeks before the first case of reverse
zoonosis was reported in a Canadian pig herd [21]. Pigs were shown to be highly
susceptible to this swine-origin human virus [22, 23] and the virus caused rapidly
numerous outbreaks worldwide, including Europe [24–26]. Adaptation of
H1N1pdm to swine and ongoing spread in pigs was later demonstrated [27].
Ongoing knowledge of viral strains and lineages circulating in pigs is
indispensable for the detection, prevention and control of the disease in pigs, but
also to detect novel reassortant viruses that may pose a threat to the human
population. From November 2010 to October 2013, the ‘‘European Surveillance
Network for Influenza in Pigs 3’’ (ESNIP3) extended and intensified the
surveillance programs that were established during two previous European
coordination actions, ESNIP1 and ESNIP2 (http://www.esnip3.eu). This paper
describes the surveillance programs that were carried out in the different countries
involved in ESNIP3, as well as the laboratory tests used for detection, isolation
and initial subtyping (HA and NA molecular subtyping and/or virus antigenic
subtyping) of SIV strains. It reports the dominant enzootic SIV lineages and
emerging reassortant viruses with zoonotic potential that have been identified by
ESNIP3 partners in 14 European countries from 2010 to 2013.
Materials and Methods
Partners
Within the ESNIP3 consortium, 16 partners were involved in SIV surveillance
(Table 1). All partners except Merial SAS contributed directly to both surveillance
and laboratory investigations. Merial SAS participated in the network and
supported the surveillance under specific collaborations with other partners,
especially by enhancing the flow of material from the field to the partner
laboratories. FLI, Germany, kindly provided data obtained in a specific research
program operational in 2011–2012. Israel was included in this study due to its
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association with the European Union’s Framework Program for Research and
Technical Development and its participation in the ESNIP 3 project.
Inventories of surveillance programs
An inventory of swine influenza surveillance programs implemented in the
different participating countries was carried out by sending a questionnaire to
partners (S1 Table). This questionnaire asked if the virological surveillance was
passive and/or active, if there were serological investigations, who was conducting
the different surveillance programs, who paid for sampling and testing, if there
were national networks, who provided sampling kits, who reported clinical
influenza-like events, who took the biological samples and which areas or regions
within the country were monitored.
Inventory of virological diagnostic methods and diagnostic
assistance
An inventory of virological diagnostic methods in use by the partners’ laboratories
was carried out through a second questionnaire (S2 Table). Partners were asked to
indicate their use of molecular tests and/or other protocols to detect influenza A
viruses in pig samples, the system (cells, eggs) used for virus isolation, as well as
the specific assays run to subtype the viruses detected and/or isolated. The
questionnaire also asked partners to list antisera in use for preliminary antigenic
subtyping by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) and neuraminidase inhibition
(NI) tests.
To assist in virus subtyping by HI and NI assays, a standard panel of five
antisera was provided to partners. These sera were produced in specific pathogen
free (SPF) pigs at Anses, France, and were preliminarily tested in five laboratories
before dispatching. Three of them were hyperimmune sera against strains
previously used as reference antigens during ESNIP1 and ESNIP2: A/Sw/Finistere/
2889/1982 (H1avN1), A/Sw/Flanders/1/1998 (H3N2) and A/Sw/Scotland/410440/
1994 (H1avN2) [13, 15]. The fourth one was a hyper immune serum raised against
a more recent H1avN1 SIV isolate, A/Sw/Cotes d’Armor/0388/2009, and the fifth
serum was a post-vaccination serum produced in SPF pigs and containing
antibodies against A/California/04/09 (H1N1pdm). These hyperimmune and
post-vaccination sera exhibited HI titres against homologous viruses that ranged
between 1:640 and 1:2560.
Virological surveillance
Data collected and provided by the 15 partners directly involved in virological
surveillance consisted of (i) the number of submissions they received (i.e. the
number of investigated herds), (ii) the number of successful detections of
influenza A viruses (i.e. the number of positive herds), (iii) the number of viruses
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that were preliminary subtyped (based on HA and/or NA identification), and (iv)
the number of viruses identified within each lineage.
Results
Inventory of surveillance programs
The inventory of surveillance systems indicated that the mode, extension and
intensity of surveillance programs varied between countries and that several
partners had reinforced and adapted their surveillance schemes since 2009. All
together, the 16 ESNIP3 partners conducted surveillance in 17 different countries
(Table 1). All partners except KVI, Israel, used a passive surveillance system based
on reporting of clinical acute respiratory disease in pigs.
Outbreaks of acute respiratory disease were reported in general by examining
veterinarians, but farmers (or farm technicians) were also involved, directly or
indirectly through veterinarians. In six countries, pathologists also contributed to
the surveillance. Passive surveillance was carried out effectively either in the whole
country or in some administrative regions only, depending on the partner and the
type of surveillance program (Table 1). However, even when national programs
were implemented, areas with a high density of pig populations remained the
most investigated, as for example Brittany in France, northern and central parts of
Italy, Northwest Germany and Northeast Spain (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/).
Specific programs supported by the pig industry and/or vaccine-producing
companies contributed to the surveillance on an ad hoc basis, for example in France
and Germany [28–30]. In Finland, France, Denmark and the United Kingdom, the
passive surveillance was organized and fully or partly funded at the national level by
the government, with voluntary private practitioners liaising with specified
veterinary laboratories agreed over identification of SIVs. This procedure designed
an algorithm that finally resulted in the submission of positive samples to the
ESNIP3 partner laboratory for virus identification [31, 32]. In other countries,
partners collaborated with their own network of selected examining veterinarians
(Table 1). Most of the time, biological samples were taken by veterinarians or
pharmaceutical company’s employees, but in several cases samples were also taken
by scientists from partner institutes themselves, e.g. when implementing specific
research programs in the context of the surveillance.
Acute respiratory disease involving influenza A virus in swine is most often
characterized by fever, apathy, anorexia, sneezing, nasal discharge and coughing
[2]. Nasal swabs from sick animals were therefore the most common samples
(Table 1). In some cases of mortality, tissue samples from the lungs and/or the
upper respiratory tract were also taken for virus detection. Clinical materials taken
from pigs were sent to local veterinary laboratories and/or the partner laboratory,
accompanied with information including at least the location of the farm at the
regional level and the date of sample collection.
In some countries, authorities, pig producers and/or research laboratories
undertook some active surveillance at the time of the 2009 pandemic for detection
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of H1N1pdm virus. However, use of active surveillance was restricted to IDT
(Germany), KVI (Israel) and UTH (Greece) during ESNIP3 (Table 1). These
programs were predominantly structured on an ad-hoc basis and for instance were
conducted in response to a specific question, i.e. about infections with a given
virus in a particular region in association with a disease problem. Otherwise they
targeted only animals at slaughter.
The main focus of ESNIP3 was virological surveillance so serological
surveillance was not routinely carried out by all partners (Table 1). In some cases,
serological investigations were undertaken in response to clinical outbreaks and
were linked to the passive virological system. Sometimes, serological surveillance
was conducted as part of a structured approach which included a selection of
farms in a region, aiming to measure seroprevalence and addressing particular
questions in relation to the husbandry of pigs and spread of SIVs. During ESNIP3,
such serological surveillance programs were implemented by KVI (Israel), UTH
(Greece) and NVRI (Poland) in order to provide additional data to the passive
surveillance.
Inventory of diagnostic tests
Nasal swabs and/or lung or trachea tissue samples were processed most often
individually, following standard procedures [33].
Virus detection and molecular subtyping
The inventory of diagnostic methods indicated that all partners, except one,
initially screened clinical samples for detection of any Influenza A virus by
carrying out conventional or real-time RT-PCR assays (Table 2). Partners used
different protocols either they had developed and/or had adapted from previously
published methods (references are given in Table 2). These tests were based on
amplification of the matrix (M) gene or more rarely the nucleoprotein (NP) gene.
Once influenza A virus was detected in a sample following initial screening by M
or NP gene-specific RT-PCR, several laboratories carried out RT-PCR assays
specific for HA and/or NA genes for preliminary subtyping (Table 2). Most often,
real-time RT-PCR assays that specifically detect H1pdm and N1pdm genes were
carried out first. Then, conventional simplex or multiplex RT-PCR assays allowing
the amplification of HA and NA genes from European SIVs were applied to
H1N1pdm-negative samples by some partners. These multiplex RT-PCRs
intended to discriminate either H1 from H3, or H1av from H1hu and H3, or N1
from N2. When combined, these two specific RT-PCR assays allowed users to
rapidly identify H1avN1, H1huN2 and H3N2 viruses, as well as reassortant viruses
that would have exchanged their HA or NA genes, such as rH1avN2 or rH1huN2
viruses. In other laboratories, ‘‘pan HA’’ and ‘‘pan NA’’ assays were used to
amplify HA and NA genes independent of their lineages which were then
identified by partial gene sequencing.
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Table 2. Overview of RT-PCR techniques and pig sera used by 15 ESNIP3 partners for detection and preliminary subtyping of influenza A viruses in pig
samples (rt5 real-time; conv.5 conventional; n.a.5 not applicable; CA5 Cotes d’Armor; Fin5Finistere; Eng5 England; Calif5 California; Scot5 Scotland;
Neth5 Netherlands; It5Italy).
Partner RT-PCR techniques Sera for routine antigenic subtyping, directed against SIV subtype:
for detection
for molecular
subtyping H1avN1 H1huN2 H3N2 H1N1pdm
AHVLA rt, M gene,
TaqMan [45]
rt, H1pdm,
TaqMan [45]
sw/Eng/195852/92; sw/
Eng/604718/96
sw/Scot/410440/94*; sw/
Eng/17394/96; sw/Eng/
438207/94; sw/Eng/
142162/10
sw/Gent/1/84; sw/Eng/
163266/87; sw/Eng/
201635/92
Calif/7/09
Anses rt, M gene,
TaqMan [47]
commercial kits
from LSI and
ADIAGENE)
rt, H1pdm,
TaqMan; rt,
N1pdm, TaqMan
[47] (commercial
kits from LSI and
ADIAGENE);
conv., multiplex
H1av/H1hu/H3;
conv., multiplex
N1/N2 adapted
from [64]
sw/Morbihan/0070/05; sw/
CA/0388/09*
sw/Scot/410440/94*; sw/
CA/0113/06
sw/Flandres/1/98*; Calif/4/09*; sw/
Sarthe/0255/10
CVI rt, M gene,
TaqMan (in-
house)
conv., pan HA (+
sequencing);
conv., pan NA (+
sequencing) (in-
house)
sw/Best/96 sw/Gent/7625/99 sw/Oedenrode/96 Neth/602/09
EVIRA rt, M gene +
H1pdm,
TaqMan [45]
conv., pan HA(+
partial sequen-
cing); conv., pan
NA (+ partial
sequencing) [40]
sw/Best/96 sw/Gent/7625/99 sw/Oedenrode/96 n.a.
FLI rt, M gene,
TaqMan [65]
rt, H1pdm,
TaqMan [46]; rt,
pan HA; rt, pan
NA [29, 66, 67]
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
HIPRA rt, M gene,
SybrGreen [68]
conv., multiplex
H1/H3; conv.,
multiplex N1/N2
[69]
sw/Fin/2899/82* sw/Scot/410440/94* sw/Gent/84 n.a.
IDT conv., M gene
[68]
conv., pan H1;
conv., H1; conv.,
H3; conv., N1;
conv., N2; [30]
sw/IDT/Re230/93 sw/Visbek/IDT3311/04 sw/IDT/Re220/93 Jena/VI2688/09
IZLER rt, M gene,
TaqMan [22]
conv., multiplex
H1av/H1hu/H3;
conv., multiplex
N1/N2 [64]
sw/It/1513/98; sw/Fin/2899/
82*
sw/It/1521/98; sw/It/2064/
99; sw/Scot/410440/94*;
sw/It/284922/09
sw/CA/3633/82; sw/It/
1523/98; sw/Gent/84
sw/It/290271/09
KVI rt, M gene,
TaqMan [45]
n.a. sw/CA/0388/09* sw/Scot/410440/94* sw/Flandres/1/98* Calif/4/09*
LCV rt, M gene,
TaqMan [45]
rt, H1pdm, Taq
Man [45]; conv.,
multiplex H1/H3;
conv., multiplex
N1/N2 [69]
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Virus isolation and antigenic subtyping
In case RT-PCR assays for molecular subtyping were not available in the partner
laboratory, were not routinely carried out, or were unsuccessful on clinical
samples for example due to limited amounts of viral RNA, attempts to isolate the
detected virus were initiated either in Madin Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells
or in 10-day-old SPF embryonated chicken’s eggs, according to standard
procedures [33]. IZSLER, Italy, also used human Caucasian Colon adenocarci-
noma (CaCo-2) cells for virus isolation [34].
Once isolated, viruses were submitted to molecular subtyping using the specific
RT-PCR assays described above and/or to antigenic subtyping by HI and/or NI
tests [33]. Eleven partners performed HI tests using sera either provided by the
ESNIP3 reference panel, or produced against local strains, or obtained elsewhere
(Table 2).
Table 2. Cont.
Partner RT-PCR techniques Sera for routine antigenic subtyping, directed against SIV subtype:
for detection
for molecular
subtyping H1avN1 H1huN2 H3N2 H1N1pdm
NVRI rt, M gene,
TaqMan
adapted from
[70]; rt, M gene,
PriProEt [71]
rt, H1pdm, Taq
Mana [45]; conv.,
multiplex H1av/
H1hu/H3; conv.,
multiplex N1/N2
adapted from
[64] + sequen-
cing [72]
sw/Belgium/1/98 sw/Gent/7625/99 sw/Flanders/1/98 Calif/7/09
UGent n.a. n.a. sw/Belgium/1/98; sw/Fin/
2899/82*
sw/Gent/7625/99; sw/Scot/
410440/94*
sw/Flanders/1/98*; sw/
Gent/84
Calif/7/09
UTH conv., M genea
[68]
conv., H1pdma
(in-house,
adapted from
WHO); conv.,
multiplex H1av/
H1hu/H3; conv.,
multiplex N1/N2
[64]
sw/Fin/2899/82*; sw/Gent/
132/05; sw/CA/0388/09*
sw/Scot/410440/94*; sw/
Gent/177/02
sw/Gent/84; sw/Gent/
131/05
Calif/7/09
VDD rt, M gene,
TaqMan [45]
rt, H1pdm,
TaqMan [45];
conv., pan HA (+
partial sequen-
cing); conv., pan
NA (+ partial
sequencing)
[72, 73]
sw/Belgium/1/98 sw/Gent/7625/99 sw/Flanders/1/98* n.a.
VET-DTU rt, M gene,
PriProEt
[68, 74]; rt, NP
gene,
SybrGreen [75]
rt, H1pdm (in
house); conv.,
H1; conv., H3;
conv., N1; conv.,
N2 (in-house); rt,
pan HA; rt, pan
NA [66, 67]
n.a n.a. n.a. n.a.
Virus strains marked with an asterisk (*) were used to produce sera belonging to the ESNIP3 reference panel.
aSince end 2012 (used during the third yearly period of the project).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115815.t002
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Results of virological surveillance
The extensive virological surveillance conducted by ESNIP3 partners from
November 2010 to October 2013 included the examination of 9025 herds from 17
countries (Table 3). The intensity of the surveillance programs was highly variable
across the countries involved but most often correlated to the level of pork meat
production (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). Thus, areas with intensive pro-
duction inevitably resulted in a greater total number of investigated herds when
Table 3. Number of investigated and positive herds obtained in each country by the different partners, in the three 12-month periods of the ESNIP3 program
as well as in total from November 2010 to October 2013.
Country Partner Nov 2010–Oct 2011 Nov 2011–Oct 2012 Nov 2012–Oct 2013 November 2010–October 2013
Investigated
herds
Positive
herds
Investigated
herds
Positive
herds
Investigated
herds
Positive
herds
Investigated
herds
Positive
herds
Percentage
positive
Subtyped
viruses
Belarus NVRI 0 0 8 0 12 2 20 2 10% 0
Belgium UGent 36 11 32 9 28 9 96 29 30% 29
Denmark VET-
DTU
371 119 320 143 480 226 1171 488 42% 254
Finland EVIRA 14 1 23 0 25 3 62 4 6% 4
France Anses 224 116 296 154 298 163 818 433 53% 350
Germany Total 1094 328 1052 366 1281 405 3427 1099 32% 874
IDT 744 187 1035 352 1281 405 3060 944 31% 754
FLI 349 140 17 14 0 0 366 154 42% 119
UGent 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 100% 1
Greece UTH 11 0 17 3 24 6 52 9 17% 3
Hungary VDD 24 7 27 9 51 19 102 35 34% 38
Israel KVI 5 3 0 0 0 0 5 3 60% 2
Italy IZSLER 500 110 556 106 1042 144 2098 360 17% 179
Lithuania NVRI 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0% 0
Netherlan-
ds
Total 18 7 50 28 19 7 87 42 48% 39
CVI 0 0 26 13 2 1 28 14 50% 11
UGent 18 7 24 15 4 3 46 25 54% 25
IDT 0 0 0 0 13 3 13 3 23% 3
Poland Total 32 15 65 22 88 19 185 56 30% 30
NVRI 32 15 65 22 56 18 153 55 36% 29
IDT 0 0 0 0 32 1 32 1 3% 1
Russia NVRI 0 0 0 0 3 2 3 2 67% 0
Slovakia NVRI 1 1 0 0 2 0 3 1 33% 1
Spain Total 59 14 138 24 174 43 371 81 22% 27
HIPRA 54 13 133 24 168 43 355 80 23% 27
LCV 5 1 5 0 6 0 16 1 6% 0
United-
Kingdom
AHVLA 168 39 180 36 176 40 524 115 22% 57
Total 2557 771 2764 900 3704 1088 9025 2759 31% 1887
Percentages of positive herds and total numbers of viruses that were subtyped in the context of the passive surveillance are also given. When several
partners were involved in the surveillance in a country, individual numbers are indicated in grey.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115815.t003
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specific private or public surveillance programs were in place, such as in Germany,
Italy, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. In other countries with high pig
population density such as Poland and Spain, visits on farms with acute
respiratory syndrome were encouraged by ESNIP3 and increased over time. Thus,
an increase of nearly 45% in the number of investigated herds was observed
between the first year and the third year of the ESNIP3 program (Table 3). The
number of samples collected from a herd was most often comprised between 3
and 15, depending on the surveillance programs, but a herd was considered
positive when at least one sample tested positive. These visits on farms resulted in
the detection of influenza A virus in 31% of cases (2759 positive herds out 9025).
Similar to the numbers of investigations, the frequency of positive cases was highly
variable depending on the country, ranging from 3% to 67% (Table 3). However,
Influenza A virus infections were everywhere confirmed throughout the year,
whatever the season (data not shown).
Out of the 2759 positive farms, 1887 influenza A viruses (nearly 70% of the
total) derived from 14 different countries were HA and NA subtyped, either
directly in positive biological samples or after virus isolation (Table 4).
Preliminary subtyping showed that in most countries the European enzootic SIVs
as well as the H1N1pdm constituted the dominating subtypes (Table 4).
Consistent with results obtained within previous ESNIP1 and ESNIP2 actions
between 2000 and 2008 [13–15], the ‘‘avian-like swine H1N1’’ (H1avN1) lineage
that emerged in 1979 was the most frequent lineage in every country, reaching
53.6% of frequency in relation to other subtypes identified during the period. By
contrast, the enzootic ‘‘human-like reassortant swine H3N2’’ lineage that emerged
in 1984 accounted for only 9.1% of the identified viruses. The result was already
reported during ESNIP2 that this virus was no longer detected in some regions
with high pig population density, whereas it was still prevalent in other parts of
Europe. Thus, H3N2 circulated widely in many of the main pig producing regions
such as Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Spain but was almost
exclusively absent for many years in Denmark, United-Kingdom and France. Only
one isolate was obtained in France in early 2012, in the northern part close to the
Belgian border [35]. In fact, the enzootic ‘‘human-like reassortant swine H1N2’’
(H1huN2) lineage that emerged in 1994 represented the second most frequent
genetic lineage of SIVs in circulation in Europe, being identified in 13% of the
viruses characterized in this study. Furthermore, reassortant viruses between the
three enzootic SIV subtypes, i.e. rH1huN1 and rH1avN2, were detected in 7.4% of
cases, in several countries. One rH1avN2 has been evidenced to have been
established in the swine population in Denmark.
In the period 2010 to 2013, pandemic-like swine H1N1 (H1N1pdm) viruses
were identified in numerous countries such as Germany, Denmark, United-
Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, Italy, France and Finland (Table 4). In contrast, they
were not detected in some other countries having notable numbers of detected
influenza cases such as Belgium, The Netherlands and Spain. In Finland, only
sporadic detections of the H1N1pdm virus were made several months after the
end of the pandemic in humans, but in most countries, this virus was isolated at
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an increasing incidence over time since 2010 (data not shown). It was also
detected in Israel through an active surveillance program, in a pig herd without
any clinical signs. Co-circulation of H1N1pdm with European enzootic H1N1,
H1N2 and H3N2 SIVs resulted in various reassortment events, leading to the
detection of novel reassortant viruses that had mainly exchanged HA and/or NA
genes. These viruses accounted for 6.5% of those identified, and therefore at
similar levels almost as other reassortant viruses between old enzootic strains. All
together, 16.8% of the viruses were H1N1pdm-like viruses or reassortant viruses
that had acquired at least the HA or NA gene from the H1N1pdm virus, placing
H1N1pdm variants as the second most commonly detected strain after H1avN1
viruses.
Discussion
Following the emergence of H1N1pdm in 2009 and its spread to pigs in many
countries worldwide, the OIE and FAO encouraged countries to address and/or
reinforce SIV surveillance. The network organized under the auspices of the EU
coordinated action ESNIP3 from November 2010 to October 2013, showed that
the surveillance systems greatly relied on the involvement of the pig industry, the
medical companies and the governments. Thus, at a national level, cooperation
Table 4. Number of viruses identified within the different haemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes and lineages in 14 countries from November 2010 to
October 2013.
Country
Number of subtyped
viruses Influenza A virus subtypes and lineages within subtypes
H1N1 H3N2 H1N2 Others
H1avN1 rH1huN1 H1N1pdm H3N2 H1huN2 rH1avN2
reass. pdm-like sw
HxNy
Belgium 29 16 0 0 10 3 0 0
Denmark 254 68 0 79 0 0 89 18
Finland 4 1 0 3 0 0 0 0
France 350 240 4 7 1 88 10 0
Germany 874 536 6 40 88 94 23 87
Greece 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
Hungary 38 19 0 12 4 1 0 2
Israel 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Italy 179 82 2 10 38 39 7 1
Netherlands 39 19 0 0 11 9 0 0
Poland 30 15 0 11 3 1 0 0
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 27 10 0 0 12 5 0 0
United-Kingdom 57 4 0 32 0 6 0 15
Total 1887 1011 12 195 171 246 129 123
% 53.6 0.6 10.3 9.1 13.0 6.8 6.5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115815.t004
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between producers, veterinarians, local veterinary laboratories, laboratories
conducting reference diagnostic and/or research activities, as well as national
authorities, appeared to be a vital part of these voluntary surveillance programs.
Amongst the 10 countries with higher intensity pig production (http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/), differences in numbers of herds investigated during the
three year period of the program were probably partly related to the robustness of
the local surveillance programs. However, variations in frequency of SIV
infections and clinical expression patterns may also depend on different
approaches to swine husbandry and disease control. Also, some SIV infections
may be sub-clinical, possibly depending on the virus strain and/or environmental
conditions, and might be not detected through passive surveillance. Nevertheless,
outbreaks of respiratory disease were shown to occur frequently in almost all
countries where SIV surveillance was carried out, except in Finland. In this
country few outbreaks of respiratory disease with influenza-like clinical signs were
investigated despite a surveillance program organized at the national level,
suggesting that in Finland respiratory disease is rare.
Harmonisation and standardisation of diagnostic tools for detection and
preliminary subtyping of SIVs were proposed within the ESNIP3 program.
However, diagnostic capability was highly variable across the continent and
appeared to be dependent on resourcing at national level. All but one of the
partners participating in surveillance programs deployed RT-PCR assays that were
capable of detecting influenza A virus. In a RT-PCR ring trial organized among
partners it was demonstrated that all circulating SIV subtypes were correctly
detected by participants (data not shown). Also, RT-PCR assays able to specifically
discriminate HA and NA genes from the different genetic lineages had been
developed and/or adapted in several labs for molecular subtyping in addition to
antigenic subtyping. Even if these tests need further development and
improvement for greater utility, they have already permitted large-scale screening
in biological samples and have led to the rapid identification of many novel
reassortant viruses, notably from clinical samples directly, i.e. without requiring
virus isolation and/or HA and NA sequencing.
Whilst the virological surveillance conducted in this study was based on acute
respiratory syndromes, frequencies of herds detected positive for an influenza A
virus varied greatly between countries. In most cases, these differences were
probably more related to the organization of the surveillance programs themselves
than to the SIV prevalence or the efficiency of diagnostic tools. For example, the
national surveillance program implemented in the United Kingdom was generally
dedicated to any acute respiratory disease of potential viral aetiology with a broad
spectrum of clinical signs, whereas in France, the national surveillance network
focused more specifically on respiratory disease with influenza-like clinical signs,
giving rise to a great difference in the frequency of positive cases (22% versus
57%). However, in Finland, where the number of investigated herds was low
despite a national surveillance, percentage of positive herds was also very low
(6%), confirming that SIV infections were rare in this country.
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As previously described, this ESNIP3 study confirmed that outbreaks of
influenza occur throughout the year in pigs, without marked seasonal effect
[14, 29]. The surveillance programs provided updated knowledge of the influenza
A viruses being maintained within the European pig population since the
emergence of the H1N1pdm virus in 2009. They showed that SIVs of H1avN1,
H3N2 and H1huN2 lineages, which emerged in 1979, 1984 and 1994, respectively,
still constitute enzootic lineages in circulation at the European level. Whereas the
relative frequencies of the different virus subtypes cannot be assimilated to
prevalence values at the country level, they give an indication on the occurrence of
the different viruses when they have been calculated from a large enough total
number of positive herds and/or large number of investigated herds, also taking
into account the size of the pig production. Large differences exist between
countries and relative ratio’s between these lineages have changed in several
countries since the emergence of H1N1pdm, as compared to results of the
surveillance previously conducted from 2006 to 2008 [13]. H1avN1 viruses, the
oldest of the current enzootic European SIVs, were still predominant Europe-
wide. They were detected in all countries without exception, irrespective of pig
density, either directly through virological investigations or indirectly from
complementary serological studies as in those conducted in Greece and Israel
(data not shown). However, H1avN1 viruses were superseded by H1N2 subtypes
in some regions, such as the United Kingdom or Denmark, with respect to
incidence, indicating changed dynamics and epidemiology. The proportion of
H3N2 viruses identified from 2010 to 2013 was lower than that obtained from
2006 to 2008 [13]. H3N2 viruses were found to be still highly frequent compared
to other viruses in several countries but were absent or almost absent from pig
populations in others, such as the United Kingdom, France and Denmark. In the
United Kingdom and France, H3N2 viruses were responsible for severe outbreaks
during several years in the late 80s’-early 90’s but were no longer reported since
2000, whilst H1huN2 viruses were becoming more frequent [13]. This raises
questions regarding the competitive evolutionary and viral dynamics between
strains. Widespread circulation of H1huN2 or, rH1avN2 in Denmark, may have led
to a decrease in circulation of H3N2, speculatively due to heterosubtypical
immunity based on the shared N2 and, again in Denmark, increased fitness of the
rH1avN2 subtype. However, other countries like Germany, Italy and The
Netherlands reported as many H3N2 as H1N2 viruses, suggesting that the
disappearance of H3N2 may also rely on other specific herd or regional factors
that would require further investigation.
During and after the human pandemic in 2009, the H1N1pdm virus was
regularly detected in pigs in many countries, including in Europe, and has since
become adapted to the swine [24, 26, 29, 30, 36–40]. All these local studies and the
ESNIP3 surveillance indicate that the H1N1pdm virus has become well established
in the European pig population and now can be considered as a novel enzootic
lineage. The lack of detection of any H1N1pdm in some countries such as Spain,
Belgium and The Netherlands at the time ESNIP3 was ending could be due to
multiple factors. H1N1pdm was easily transmitted from humans to pigs in areas
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previously free of any other SIVs, as for example in Norway [24] or La Re´union
Island [27]. Thus, it could be hypothesized that H1N1pdm did not infect pig
populations with a high level of immunity against SIVs and/or highly infected
with other SIVs, because of cross-protection and/or viral competition [41–43].
Especially in swine-dense areas this high level of immunity can be present, because
of frequent circulation of H1avN1 in these areas and high usage of vaccination.
This may also explain why in France and Germany authentic H1N1pdm virus was
preferentially detected in low pig density areas (data not shown). In addition, it
cannot be excluded that part of the sporadic infections with H1N1pdm may have
been caused by on-going, independent virus transmissions from humans to swine
and that these singular transmission events did not lead to sustained holding-to-
holding transmission chains. Moreover, infections with H1N1pdm did not induce
marked clinical signs sometimes, and that may also account for the difficulty to
diagnose them in passive surveillance [27]. In Norway, an active surveillance
program conducted in 2009 revealed that only 40% of the H1N1pdm seropositive
herds experienced respiratory signs [44]. This potentially raises important
questions about the necessity to implement or recommend active virological
surveillance in addition to passive surveillance. Finally, it is important to note that
H1N1pdm is sometimes difficult to detect using hemagglutination tests after
amplification on cells or in eggs. Thus, virus isolation may give false-negative
results if only the HI test is used to detect the amplified virus. Therefore partners
were advised to establish H1N1pdm specific real-time RT-PCR assays for direct
testing of clinical samples, or testing of amplification products, to make sure they
were free of H1N1pdm [45–47]. Adoption of such methods during ESNIP3 led to
the detection of H1N1pdm virus in Poland in 2013, confirming pig infections that
were serologically suspected since 2010 in this country [39].
The concomitant circulation of many different virus subtypes in herds increases
the risk for co-infections and enables subsequent genetic reassortment. Full
genome sequencing initiated on the ESNIP3 virus repository should give greater
understanding of genotypes variation in virus detected, but the current study,
based on characterisation of HA and NA genes, already identified reassortant
viruses involving the four H1avN1, H1huN2, H3N2 and H1N1pdm enzootic virus
lineages. Moreover, it appeared that the introduction of H1N1pdm into European
pig populations led to an increase in the level of incidence of second generation
reassortants since 2010. In Germany and Denmark, these ‘‘H1N1pdm-like
reassortant viruses’’ mostly consisted of H1N1pdm viruses that acquired an N2
gene from European SIVs (rH1pdmN2) [29, 30, 48, 49]. In Germany and Hungary,
other reassortants were identified as an H1N1pdm that acquired an N1 gene from
the H1avN1 lineage [50, 51]. Other various reassortants between H1N1pdm and
European SIVs of H3N2 and H1avN1 subtypes, including an H3N1 subtype, also
have been sporadically detected in pigs in Italy and Germany [30, 52, 53]. In the
United Kingdom, additional sequencing led to the identification of H1N2 viruses
that acquired internal genes from H1N1pdm [54]. To date, two reassortant
viruses of the second generation, i.e. the Danish rH1avN2 and a German
rH1pdmN2, have apparently acquired strong transmissibility and therefore were
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able to maintain themselves in pigs in Denmark and in some German regions,
respectively [30, 55]. Other reassortants with genes from the H1N1pdm virus were
also detected at an increasing frequency in areas of high pig population density, as
for example in the United Kingdom. All these viruses may become enzootic at the
European level in the near future and raise further questions as to potential
zoonotic agents.
The viruses preliminary subtyped in this study were added to the ESNIP3 virus
bank held at AHVLA, Weybridge, United Kingdom. They have been further
submitted to full genome sequencing and antigenic characterization that should
provide additional understanding on virus evolution, adequacy of diagnostic
capabilities, relatedness to currently used vaccines, etc. Especially, sequencing of
the internal genes will provide information on reassortment events that could not
be detected based on initial HA and NA subtyping. Since 2009 in the United-
States, the H1N1pdm was also shown to have frequently reassorted with old
enzootic SIVs [56–58], and since 2011 clusters of human infection with such a
swine-origin influenza H3N2 variant virus (H3N2v) containing the H1N1pdm M
gene were reported each year between April and August, at agricultural fair time
[59, 60]. Studies conducted in Asia have also demonstrated a massive
reassortment between H1N1pdm and asian conventional SIVs, with much of this
event taking place at the level of the internal gene constellations [61, 62].
Considering the increasing genetic diversity among SIVs from a given HxNy
subtype, running multiplex PCR methods that may allow identification of internal
genes in addition to identification of HA and NA encoding genes could be an
alternative for determining complete genetic lineages at the preliminary subtyping
step, without having to perform full genome sequencing of all viruses, and should
be considered in diagnostic algorithms [63].
In conclusion, surveillance of SIV infections on a European scale revealed
striking differences between countries participating in the ESNIP3 network
regarding the prevalence of ancient and newly established SIV lineages. These
differences cannot be explained easily. A careful analysis of trading networks of
swine and pork within and between EU member states should give clues as to the
likelihood of transboundary SIV transmissions. Continuing the surveillance and
providing contemporary updates on the viruses that are currently circulating
should enable the detection of novel influenza A virus in the European pig
population, once a virus has become established and have the ability to produce
disease signs in affected animals with a noticeable herd impact. This provides a
useful basis for decisions relating to veterinary health, accounting for better
prevention and intervention. Also, a global dissemination of knowledge and
information originating from surveillance of influenza A in pigs provides a
baseline for the interpretation of the role of swine influenza in zoonotic events and
interspecies transmission. This is consistent with pandemic preparedness
programs and in line with the ‘‘One Health’’ concept.
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